Effective October 23, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted a set of fair disclosure rules ('Reg FD') that prohibit companies from disclosing earnings or other material business information to some analysts or large investors before announcing it publicly. This paper empirically analyzes the implications of these new rules on several aspects of the behavior and performance of sell-side equity analysts. We analyze forecasts made for a large sample of public companies for three post-FD quarters and for several pre-FD years. We estimate panel regressions using the fixed effects model, and examine both early and late forecasts. We have three main findings. First, earnings forecasts become less accurate post-FD at the levels of both the individual analyst and the consensus. Our evidence suggests that this effect is not entirely due to the recession. Second, individual analysts following a company become more dispersed in their earnings forecasts post-FD. The magnitudes of these two effects are generally bigger in early forecasts and in firms where earnings guidance was more likely pre-FD. Third, analyst performance rankings become somewhat more stable following the adoption of these rules. These results are quite robust to alternative methodologies and empirical procedures. Our findings are consistent with a reduction in selective guidance post-FD.
Introduction
On August 10, 2000, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved a set of 'fair disclosure' rules, generally referred to as 'Reg FD'. These rules require a company to reveal any 'material' information to all investors and to Wall Street analysts simultaneously in case of intentional disclosures, or within 24 hours in case of unintentional disclosures. The rules became effective October 23, 2000. These rules are intended to put an end to the practice of selective disclosure, whereby companies give Wall Street analysts and large shareholders crucial e arnings and business information prior to making it public. The rules prohibit companies from tipping off some favored analysts, investors, and media outlets before others. They are aimed at leveling the playing field between small and large investors.
Analysts appear to have been important links between companies and investors.
Numerous media accounts (e.g., Opdyke (2000) and Ryan (2000) ) indicate that Pre-FD, companies used analysts as tools to disseminate information to investors and manage their expectations. Instead of announcing detailed, forward-looking operational and performance information publicly, managers liked to communicate it via analysts.
Managers could be more candid and precise in their one-on-one communications with analysts because they did not have to worry about liability issues. They also did not have to worry about sensitive information falling in the hands of competitors, customers, suppliers or trade unions, who might use the information for their own purposes. So analysts seem to have served as useful filters for companies seeking to communicate information to the market. Maintaining good relations with analysts also increased the likelihood of getting a favorable recommendation for the stock. Analysts obviously liked precise guidance from companies because it allowed their forecasts to become more accurate.
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Reg FD throws a fly in this ointment. Companies now have to either disclose any material information publicly or refrain from discussing it with analysts. In a recent survey by the Association for Investment Management and Research (2001) , about 90% of sell-side analysts reported regularly holding individual interviews with top managements of the companies they followed pre-FD. About 70% of the respondents reported a drop in such contact post-FD. More specifically, 80% of the analysts reported that they used to regularly request and receive earnings guidance from the companies they covered pre-FD. Post-FD, 80% of the analysts reported a drop in the availability of guidance. About 65% of the respondents also reported a drop in the overall quality of written and oral information they receive from the companies they cover. This paper empirically assesses the impact of Reg FD on two aspects of analyst performance, namely the accuracy of their earnings forecasts and the stability of rankings of their performance as forecasters, and an aspect of their forecast behavior, namely the dispersion of their forecasts. We analyze forecasts for three quarters following the adoption of fair disclosure rules and for several years before their adoption for a large sample of public companies. We employ univariate tests and panel regressions with the fixed effects model. We also examine whether the effects vary according to the age of the forecast, firm characteristics such as size or analyst following, and industry.
Since Reg FD is so recent, there are few published studies that analyze its economic effects. Timely papers by Bailey, Li, Mao and Zhang (2003) , Eleswarapu, Thompson and Venkataraman (2003) , Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang (2003) , and Irani and Karamanou (2003) We also analyze changes in analyst rankings post-FD, an issue that has not been examined by any prior study.
Our paper extends prior work on post-FD changes in forecast accuracy and dispersion in several ways. First, unlike the broad scope adopted by most prior studies, our paper focuses on changes in the accuracy, dispersion, and rankings of analysts. We provide a detailed empirical analysis of these issues using the powerful panel data econometric approach, which allows a more precise control (than cross-sectional regressions for matched-pairs samples) for 'other things'. Second, we examine the accuracy of forecasts made by individual analysts as well as the consensus. Third, we investigate differences across several interesting sub-samples where earnings guidance was more likely pre-FD.
Finally, while prior studies analyze the latest consensus forecast just before
earnings are released, we analyze both early and late forecasts. If managers enjoy a greater information advantage over analysts e arly on, there is more room for selective disclosure over this period. By the time earnings are publicly released, managers usually have little information advantage left over the market, 1 so that there is little room for selective disclosure. We find that the behavior of early forecasts is both statistically and economically different from late forecasts.
We have three main findings. First, analyst forecasts become less accurate following the adoption of fair disclosure rules. This effect is found both at the individual analyst level and at the level of the consensus (i.e., median of all analysts). We find that this effect is bigger for early forecasts than for late forecasts. Our evidence suggests that this effect cannot be entirely attributed to the recession. We argue that earnings guidance pre-FD was more likely in firms that were small, less followed or in technology and consumer services sectors. Consistent with this idea, we find that the post-FD decrease in forecast accuracy is more pronounced in t hese firms. Second, forecasts become more dispersed following Reg FD. This effect is also bigger for firms in technology and consumer services sectors. Third, analyst rankings become somewhat more stable over 1 Indeed, Heflin et al. (Table 3) find that the average magnitude of the surprise in earnings per share relative to the latest consensus forecast just before earnings release was only about 3 cents on a $10 stock pre-FD.
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time following Reg FD. These results are generally robust to alternative methodologies and empirical procedures.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the issues in more detail.
Section 3 describes the sample and data. Section 4 presents our tests and results on forecast accuracy. Section 5 deals with forecast dispersion, and section 6 tackles the issue of stability of analyst rankings. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Issues
This section discusses the potential effects of Reg FD on three aspects of the behavior and performance of stock analysts. We discuss forecast accuracy in section 2.1, forecast dispersion in section 2.2, and changes in analyst rankings in section 2.3.
Forecast accuracy
Numerous articles in the business press claim that before Reg FD took effect, 'earnings guidance' was an important facet of communication between a company and the analysts following it. A company attempted to 'guide' analysts to a quarterly earnings number that it could meet or beat, as a way of managing investor expectations.
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As a result of these direct contacts with companies, analysts had a better idea of upcoming earnings before they were announced to the public. This allowed their forecasts to be close to the subsequently announced actual earnings, thereby making forecast errors small. However with the adoption of Reg FD, the job of predicting earnings may become harder for analysts because the rules prohibit pre-announcement disclosures to analysts by companies. This implies that Reg FD should increase the absolute values of forecast errors (actual minus forecast earnings per share).
Three factors can act to attenuate this increase. First, in the absence of direct guidance from companies, analysts may increase the time and effort they spend on forecasting earnings (i.e., on being 'analysts') and decrease the time spent on client relations (i.e., on being 'salesmen'). They may increase their efforts at monitoring the company's business and performance, perhaps gathering information from alternate 6 sources such as customers, suppliers, employees and trade and industry groups. Second, companies may change their behavior too in response to the new rules. In the face of restrictions on one-on-one communication with analysts, companies may disclose more forward-looking information publicly. This may offset any effect of Reg FD. Third, the effectiveness of the new rules depends upon their enforcement by the SEC, which has limited staff and resources. In the absence of effective enforcement, the rules may have scant effect. So whether, and to what extent, the accuracy of analyst forecasts reduces post-FD is ultimately an empirical question.
Forecast dispersion
To the extent that analysts relied on earnings guidance from companies pre-FD, 
Stability of analyst rankings
Numerous stories in the financial press suggest that before Reg FD, companies sometimes favored certain analysts in providing earnings guidance. 4 To the extent that this was true, there should be a one-time change in the stability of analyst rankings upon the adoption of Reg FD. This is an important issue because rankings can affect analysts' influence on stock prices (see, e.g., Stickel (1992) ) as well as their careers (see, e.g., Mikhail, Walther and Willis (1999) , and Hong and Kubik (2003) 
Sample and data
In this section, we discuss our data in section 3.1, the origins of Reg FD in section 3.2, our choice of forecast periods in section 3.3, and sample sizes in section 3.4.
Data
The data for this study come from the I/B/E/S detail and summary history we repeated all our subsequent tests using the pre-1998 period as our pre-FD benchmark.
These results are generally quite similar to those presented in the paper. Table 3 , Panel A).
Forecast periods
Companies usually start announcing the results for a quarter beginning about two weeks after the quarter ends. An analyst following a company typically issues multiple forecasts about the earnings for a given quarter over roughly a one-year period preceding the earnings announcement. Obviously, with the passage of time, forecasts become more accurate as more information becomes available. Various analysts following a company issue and revise their forecasts at different times over this one-year interval. We choose forecast periods of about two months each to increase the likelihood that an analyst issues a forecast during the interval and to put those analysts on roughly equal footing as to the quantity and quality of information available to them.
Sample sizes
We conduct multiple tests of each of the three hypotheses discussed in section 2.
For each test, we analyze forecasts made during two periods for each of the three quarters. Each test is based on the maximum data available for the test. Consequently, sample sizes vary across the tables depending upon the availability of data. Table 1 gives a flavor for how sample sizes were arrived at for the tests presented below in sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 for the first forecast period for the quarter ended December 31, 2000 (i.e., for the last column for the first row in both panels of Table 2 ).
Column 1 of 
Forecast accuracy
The first issue we investigate is the behavior of forecast errors (actual minus forecast eps) following Reg FD. We examine this issue both at the level of the individual analyst as well as at the level of the consensus forecast. We define the normalized forecast error for analyst i following company j for forecast period t as:
where e jt = earnings per share (eps) for company j for quarter t, ê ijt = estimate of e jt by analyst i, and p jt = the latest stock price in the I/B/E/S database for company j within a given time window.
We choose the stock price rather than eps to normalize forecast errors to avoid the inference problems caused by division by zero or negative earnings. In order to avoid the problem of inflated forecast errors caused by division by very small numbers, we omit from the sample companies that have a stock price of $1 or less.
We start by presenting the results of univariate tests in section 4. 
Univariate tests
We present the results for individual analysts in section 4.1.1 and for consensus forecasts in section 4.1.2. column labeled 'post' shows the mean (median) value of NFE across all analyst-company pairs during the post-FD quarter. The column labeled 'pre' shows the corresponding pre-FD period values for the same analyst-company pairs based on the corresponding quarter for up to three years. 6 The sample includes all analyst-company pairs in the I/B/E/S database that have a NFE observation post-FD and at least one NFE observation pre-FD.
Individual analysts
The first two columns of Panel A show that the mean value of the normalized forecast error increases following Reg FD in both forecast periods for each of the three quarters.
Column 3 shows that the p -value for the matched-pairs difference is <.0001 in all six cases. The magnitude of the increase in ranges from 93% to 273%, and has a mean of 158%.
Columns 4 and 5 show that the median NFE following Reg FD also increases in all six cases. The increase is statistically significant for early forecasts in the first post-FD quarter and for late forecasts in the second and third post-FD quarters; all three differences are statistically significant at the .0001 level using the Wilcoxon test. The magnitude of the increase for these three cases is considerably lower; it ranges from 31% to 75%, with a mean of 46%.
Consensus Forecast
We next define the normalized consensus forecast error for company j for forecast period t as :
12 where ê jt = the latest median of all analyst forecasts of e jt made within a given forecast window, and p jt = the latest stock price for company j in the I/B/E/S database within the window. Once again, companies with stock price under $1 are excluded.
Panel B of Table 2 show that the mean forecast error increases following Reg FD in both forecast periods for all three quarters; the p -value is less than .0001 in all cases. The magnitude of the increase ranges from 158% to 351%, with a mean of 260%.
Columns 3 and 4 show that the median forecast error also increases in all six cases.
The increase is statistically significant in three cases f or the second and third post-FD quarters; the p -value for the Wilcoxon test is less than .0001 in all three cases. The magnitude of the increase in these three cases ranges from 136% to 200%, with a mean of 170%.
Fixed effects regressions
The evidence in Table 2 suggests that forecast errors for a firm increase post-FD, both at the level of individual analysts and the consensus. However, Table 2 does not control for "other things" that can affect the accuracy of analyst forecasts, such as characteristics of analysts and companies. It also does not control for the possibility that the observed increases are due to a systematic decrease in the scalar employed to normalize forecast errors rather than an increase in forecast errors. The post-FD period in our sample generally experienced falling stock prices.
In order to control for both possibilities, we next estimate the following crosssectional time series regression of normalized forecast errors:
where NFE ijt = | e jt -ê ijt | / p j ; p j = the latest stock price in the I/B/E/S database for company j within a given forecast period for the middle year of the sample period for a given ij in the regression; and e jt and ê ijt are as defined following equation (1) Controlling for analyst-company fixed effects, however, does not control for characteristics of shocks to earnings experienced by a company, nor does it control for the age of the forecast. Prior research (e.g., Brown (2001) ) finds striking differences in the forecast accuracy of analysts for profits versus losses. So we control for that effect by including LOSS as an explanatory variable in equation (3). Similarly, earnings may be harder to forecast when they decline, and when they change substantially, relative to the same quarter the prior year. We control for these effects by including the DECLINE and SHOCK variables in equation (3). Finally, forecasts are likely to be more accurate the closer they are to earnings release. The LAGE variable in equation (3) is intended to control for this effect. Notice also that the scalar used to normalize forecast errors (i.e., compute NFE) is a constant p j for company j, rather than p jt . This c ontrols for the possibility that a post-FD decrease in stock prices might increase the measured NFE.
This regression allows us to focus on the effect of Reg FD. A positive coefficient on REGFD would imply that forecast errors increase following the adoption of Reg FD from their normal levels for a given analyst following a certain company.
The sample period in the regression is 1997-2000 for the December ending quarter and 1998-2001 for the two subsequent quarters. The sample includes all analystcompany pairs in the I/B/E/S database that have a NFE observation post-FD and at least one NFE observation pre-FD. As with the univariate tests reported above, we estimate equation (3) for forecasts made during each of the two forecast periods for each of the three quarters. We also estimate a combined regression where we pool the data from the three quarters.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the results of estimating equation (3) 
Differential effects across firms
We next examine whether post-FD changes in forecast accuracy differ based on two firm characteristics: size or analyst following, and industry. In each case, we estimate variants of equation (3) for the combined sample of the three quarters and treat analystcompany effects (for individual analyst forecasts) or company effects (for consensus forecasts) as fixed.
Firm size or analyst following
Analyst coverage is important for a company because institutional investors, who own about two-thirds of the outstanding corporate equity, typically don't invest in stocks that lack adequate analyst coverage. (4) where SMALL j = 1 if the market value of equity of company j is below the sample median in the middle year of the sample period; it equals zero otherwise. The indicator variable LARGE j = 1 -SMALL j . The remaining variables are as defined in section 4.2 above. Estimating equation (4) is equivalent to estimating equation (3) separately for small and large firms, and allows us to test for the equality of the coefficients for the two groups of firms.
Part I of Panel A in Table 4 shows that in early forecasts at the individual analyst level, forecast errors increase significantly following Reg FD for both small and large firms; in late forecasts, they increase significantly only for small firms. The effect is much bigger for small firms than for large firms, both statistically and economically. The null hypothesis that b 2S = b 2L has a p-value < .05 for both early and late forecasts. The results are generally quite similar when we partition the sample by analyst following instead of firm size. To save space, these results are not shown in a table.
Industry effect
Next, one would expect that industries where managers provided more earnings guidance pre-FD would likely be more affected by the adoption of Reg FD. If guidance was indeed informative, we would expect post-FD forecast accuracy to reduce more in industries where guidance was more likely pre-FD. Hutton (2003) argues that pre-FD, managers were more likely to provide detailed guidance to analysts where earnings were more important to valuation but harder to forecast and where intangible assets comprised a large part of total assets. This description appears to fit two of the 11 IBES 2-digit Sector/Industry/Group (SIG) industry sectors: technology (SIG=08) and consumer services (04). 12 If so, we would expect the effect of Reg FD to be more pronounced on these two sectors vs. the rest. We define a variable for industries where guidance was more likely, GMLIND = 1 if a firm's 2-digit SIG code is 04 or 08, 0 otherwise. Similarly, we define a variable for industries where guidance was less likely, GLLIND = 1 -GMLIND. We then estimate a panel regression similar to equation (4) above, except that we replace the SMALL and LARGE variables by GMLIND and GLLIND, respectively.
Estimating this equation is similar to estimating equation (3) separately for these two groups and allows us to test for the equality of the coefficients across them.
Part II of Table 4 That is certainly a possibility. However, Table 3 shows a large increase in forecast errors for the quarter ended December 2000, a period that precedes the onset of recession.
Furthermore, our panel regressions in Table 3 incorporate several controls for possible effects of the recession on measured forecast errors. First, we use a constant scalar (a pre-FD stock price) to compute normalized forecast errors (NFE) for all years that a company is included in a regression. This procedure controls for the possibility that the increase in
NFEs is driven by a post-FD decrease in stock prices rather than an increase in forecast errors. Second, we control for the effect of an economic downturn at the firm-level. The panel regressions in Table 3 control for three variables that measure the sign and magnitude of the earnings shock experienced by a firm (LOSS, DECLINE and SHOCK).
As discussed in section 4.2 above, we find an increase in forecast errors after controlling for these variables. These firm-level controls ought to be more precise than controls at the level of the economy or the industry. So our evidence points against the recession being the sole explanation for the greater forecast errors that we observe post-FD. Heflin et al. (2003) also examine changes in consensus forecast errors post-FD.
Comparison with prior FD research
Their Table 4 reports the results of cross-sectional regressions for a matched pairs sample that has one observation for a firm post-FD and one observation pre-FD. The regressions reported in Panel B o f our Table 3 use a panel dataset that has upto three annual observations for a firm for a given quarter pre-FD and one observation post-FD, and treat company effects as fixed. Using multi-year pre-FD data allows a better determination of the normal level of forecast accuracy for a firm. The company fixed effects model and our panel dataset allow us to better abstract from cross-sectional differences in fixed firm characteristics that might affect forecast accuracy than is possible with a cross-sectional regression. Our approach focuses on differences in forecast errors for a firm over time relative to its time-series mean. Like Heflin, et al., we use a constant scalar (a pre-FD stock price) to normalize forecast errors for all the years for a company in the regression and control for forecast age and several characteristics of a firm's earnings shocks that can be expected to vary from period to period. For the overall sample of both small and large firms, consensus forecast errors increase significantly both for our early and late forecasts as well as for forecasts made just before earnings release. The pattern is similar for individual analyst forecasts. 13 The median ages of our early and late consensus forecasts, shown in column 5 of Panel B in 
Forecast dispersion
We next examine changes i n the dispersion of analyst forecasts post-FD. Since a company can no longer guide analysts to a precise earnings number, analysts now have to rely on their individual analyses. This is likely to result in more disperse forecasts, unless the rules are not effectively enforced or companies substitute more public disclosure for private guidance to analysts.
We present the results of univariate tests in section 5.1 and fixed effects regressions in section 5.2. Section 5.3 examines whether the results differ based on three firm characteristics.
Univariate tests
We compute the coefficient of variation of analysts' forecasts of eps for company j for forecast period t as
where σ jt and Χ jt equal, respectively, the standard d eviation and the mean of the forecasts of all analysts following the company. Companies followed by two or fewer analysts and companies having mean eps forecasts with an absolute value of $ 0.10 or lower are excluded. Table 6 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 show that the mean COV values increase post-FD for both forecast periods in each of the three quarters; the difference is statistically significant in all periods except for the early forecasts for the December quarter.
Columns 4 and 5 show a somewhat similar pattern. The median COV values increase significantly in all periods; the difference is statistically significant in both forecast periods for the December and March quarters.
Fixed effects regressions
The results in Table 6 suggest that the dispersion of analyst forecasts for a firm increases post-FD. However, Table 6 does not control for systematic differences in firm characteristics that can affect the dispersion of analyst forecasts. It also does not control for the possibility that the observed increases are due to a systematic decrease in the scalar employed to normalize forecast dispersion rather than an increase in forecast dispersion itself. In order to control for both possibilities, w e next estimate the following cross-sectional time-series regression of the dispersion of analyst forecasts: In estimating equation (6), we treat company effects as fixed. As in section 4.2, we are not interested in explaining differences across firms in t he normal level of forecast dispersion. Instead, we focus on whether forecast dispersion changes in response to Reg FD, after controlling for the normal level of dispersion for each company over the sample Heflin et al. (see fn. 13 above).
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period. The company fixed effects estimate of equation (8) allows us to abstract from the effects of fixed firm characteristics that affect forecast dispersion. As in equation (3), we control for potential differences in characteristics of earnings shocks for a firm (LOSS, DECLINE and SHOCK). We can not control for forecast AGE because the unit of observation in equation (6) is a company while AGE varies across analysts following a company.
We estimate equation (8) separately for both forecast periods preceding each quarter as well as for the combined sample of the three quarters. Table 7 
Differential effects across firms
We next examine if this effect differs based on two firm characteristics: size or analyst following, and industry. In each case, we estimate variants of equation (6) for the combined sample of the three quarters and use the company fixed effects model.
Firm size or analyst following
As discussed in section 4.3.1, small or less followed firms may have engaged more in selective disclosure pre-FD in order to attract and retain analyst coverage. If so, and to the extent that the dispersion of analyst forecasts increases post-FD, we would 23 expect the observed effect to be more pronounced in small firms. 
where SMALL j = 1 if the market value of equity of company j is below the sample median in the middle year of the sample period; it equals zero otherwise. The indicator variable LARGE j = 1 -SMALL j . The remaining variables are as defined in sections 4.2 and 5.2 above. The sample period is 1997-2001.
Panel A of Table 8 shows estimates of equation (7) for both forecast periods for the combined sample of the three quarters. In the early forecast period, the normalized forecast dispersion (NS) increases significantly following Reg FD for both small and large firms. In the late forecast period, there is no significant increase in NS for either group. There is no significant difference in post-FD NS increases between small and large firms in either forecast period.
Industry
As in section 4.3.2, we would expect any effect of FD on forecast dispersion to be more pronounced in industries where guidance was more likely pre-FD. Since we find evidence on an increase in dispersion in Table 7 for the early forecast period, we would expect this effect to be stronger i n such industries. We estimate a panel regression similar to equation (7) above, except that we replace the SMALL and LARGE variables by the GMLIND and GLLIND variables, respectively.
Panel B of Table 8 shows that for early forecasts, dispersion increases post-FD for both groups of industries, but the increase is bigger for industries where guidance was more likely pre-FD. For late forecasts, there is no significant increase in dispersion for either industry group.
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Comparison with prior FD research
Prior research finds mixed results on post-FD changes in forecast dispersion across analysts. While Irani and Karamanou (2003) ) find that dispersion increases, Heflin et al. (2003) find that it does not. Our results on the dispersion of forecasts examined by prior research, namely the latest forecasts for large firms, are shown in Panel A of Table   8 . Consistent with Heflin et al., we find no significant increase in dispersion for late forecasts. However, for early forecasts, we find a significant increase i n forecast dispersion for both small and large firms. This pattern also holds for our full sample (see Table 7 ). In addition, we find (see Panel B of Table 8 ) that the magnitude of the increase in post-FD dispersion of early forecasts is significantly bigger for firms in industries where guidance is more likely than in other industries, an issue not examined by prior research.
Stability of analyst rankings
Finally, we examine changes in the stability of analyst rankings from year to year immediately following the adoption of fair disclosure rules. As discussed in section 2. We discuss computation of analyst performance scores in section 6.1 and present the results of analyst fixed effects regressions of score changes in section 6.2.
Analyst performance scores
We compute a change in the performance score of analyst i for forecast period t as:
25 where SCORE it = analyst i's average performance score in year t. The performance score of analyst i following company j for forecast period t is calculated as s ijt = 100-{(r ijt -1) / (n jt -1)}*100 (9) where r ijt is the rank of analyst i following company j in year t and n jt is the number of analysts following company j in year t. The most accurate analyst following company j receives the rank of one. The average performance score of an analyst in a given year is the average score across all companies followed by her. 15 This algorithm for computing SCORE follows Hong, Kubik and Solomon (2000), and takes into account differences across analysts in the number of companies covered and in the analyst coverage of those companies. 16 The sample excludes all companies that are followed by only one analyst and all analysts that follow only one company.
The performance score simply converts an analyst's raw rank to a percentile ranking that takes into account the number of analysts following a company. As an example, for a company followed by 11 analysts, the top analyst gets a score of 100 using equation (13), the analyst ranked 6 gets a score of 50 and the bottom analyst gets a score of 0. The average performance score across all companies followed by an analyst is more meaningful than the average of her raw ranks. Consider, for example, an analyst who follows just two companies and is ranked 4 on each based on her forecast accuracy. Five analysts follow company 1, while 26 follow company 2. Using equation (9), her performance score, s, works out to 25 for company 1 and 88 for company 2, for an average score of 56.5. That denotes just slightly above-average performance. On the other hand, her average rank is 4, which is not very informative of her performance. 15 We analyze changes in average performance scores of analysts rather than changes in performance scores for individual companies followed by them to reduce data requirements and to avoid the associated selection issues.
26 one year to the next. These are the sample averages of changes in analysts' average performance scores over 1995 to 1996 and 1997 to 1998 (not reported in a table).
Fixed effects regressions
We examine this issue after controlling for analyst fixed effects. We estimate the following cross-sectional time series regression: We estimate equation (10) for both forecast periods for each of the three quarters and for the combined sample of the three quarters. The model abstracts f rom normal levels of score changes across analysts. Instead, it focuses on score changes following Reg FD, after controlling for the normal level of score change for each analyst over the sample period. As discussed above, this control is based on two to t hree ∆SCORE observations for each analyst over successive, non-overlapping pairs of years for each quarter. 17 Unlike the regressions in sections 4.2 and 5.2 above, the analysis here is at the level of an analyst rather than an analyst-company or a company. So we cannot control for potential differences across companies with profits vs. losses.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 show a reduction in ∆SCORE following Reg FD for each of the three quarters examined; the effect is statistically significant at the 5% level or better for the March and June ending quarters. For the combined sample of the three quarters, the reduction amounts to about 1.3 and 1.5 percentage points for the first and second forecast periods, respectively; both are statistically significant at the 1% level.
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Analyst rankings, on which the performance scores are based, become somewhat more stable following the adoption of fair disclosure rules. 18 As discussed in section 2.3, this finding is consistent with the joint propositions that analysts differ in their research abilities and companies favored different analysts over time pre-FD. The former proposition is consistent with the findings of prior research (e.g., Sinha, Brown and Das (1997) ). The latter behavior is consistent with a company's desire to avoid alienating a large group of its analysts, as would happen if it persistently favored just one or a select few analysts. A company relies on its analysts to generate and sustain institutional interest in the stock and therefore has an incentive to maintain good relations with them.
Summary and concluding remarks
This paper analyzes changes in the behavior and performance of sell-side equity analysts following the October 2000 adoption of fair disclosure rules by the SEC. These rules put severe restrictions on one-on-one communication between a company and the analysts following it, and between the company and its investors. Generally referred to as Reg FD, these rules ban the practice of 'selective guidance,' where a company provides future earnings and other crucial business information to analysts and large investors without simultaneously releasing it to all investors. Pushed by the then SEC chairman Arthur Levitt, these rules are intended to level the playing field for all investors.
We compare forecasts of earnings for three quarters following the adoption of Reg FD with the average of the corresponding quarter over the previous three to five years. We conduct univariate tests and perform panel regressions using the fixed effects model. We also investigate whether the effects differ based on forecast age, firm characteristics such as size or analyst following, and industry. The analysis is based on a large sample of public companies and the analysts following them.
We have three main f indings. First, earnings forecasts become less accurate following Reg FD, both at the level of the individual analyst and the consensus. The magnitude of this effect is larger for early forecasts than for late forecasts. Our evidence suggests that this effect can not be entirely attributed to the economic downturn during our post-FD period. Second, individual analysts following a company are more dispersed in their earnings forecasts post-FD, particularly for early forecasts. Third, analyst performance rankings become somewhat more stable following the adoption of fair disclosure rules. All these effects are found both in univariate tests and in panel regressions controlling for the relevant fixed effects.
We find that analyst forecasts are less accurate in each of the three post-FD quarters relative to their pre-FD benchmarks. But the increase in forecast dispersion and in the stability of analyst rankings is observed beginning only in the second quarter post-FD; these effects are absent in the first post-FD quarter. A possible explanation for this pattern is that in the first post-FD quarter, private information provided by managers to analysts pre-FD may still have been current. With the passage of time, private information starts to dry out and the rules start to have an effect.
We find that the decrease in forecast accuracy post-FD is more pronounced in firms where guidance was more likely pre-FD. Accordingly, we find bigger decreases in forecast accuracy for firms that are small, less followed, or in technology or consumer services sectors. Similarly, the increase in forecast dispersion is bigger for firms in technology or consumer services sectors.
To summarize, we find that post-FD, analysts become (1) less accurate and (2) more dispersed in their f orecasts, and (3) where NFE ijt = | e jt -ê ijt | / p j ; e jt = earnings per share (eps) for company j for a given quarter of year t; ê ijt = estimate of e jt by analyst i; and p j = the latest stock price in the I/B/E/S database for company j within a given forecast period for the middle year of the sample period for a given ij in the regression. The indicator variable REGFD t equals one for the post-Reg FD period (i.e., year 2000 for the December ending quarter and year 2001 for March and June ending quarters), and zero otherwise. The variable LAGE ijt = ln (AGE ijt + 1), where AGE ijt is the number of days between the forecast date and earnings release. The indicator variable LOSS jt =1 if e jt <0, and 0 otherwise. The indicator variable DECLINE jt = 1, if e jt < e j,t-1 , and 0 otherwise; where e j,t-1 = e j for the corresponding quarter of year t-1. The variable SHOCK jt = |e jt -e j,t-1 | / p j . The regression treats analyst-company effects as fixed. The reported R 2 values are based on the overall variation within and across analyst-company pairs. The sample period is 1997-2000 for the December ending quarter and 1998-2001 for the two subsequent quarters. The sample includes all company-analyst pairs in the I/B/E/S database that have a NFE observation post-FD and at least one NFE observation pre-FD. The windows for the early and late forecasts for each quarter are as in Table 2 . For each window, the latest eps estimate made by an analyst is used. The combined sample pools observations from the three quarters. Companies with stock price under $1 are excluded from the sample. Panel B shows the corresponding regressions for the consensus forecasts where company effects are treated as fixed. The p-value of the F-test of the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal zero and the null hypothesis that all unobserved effects equal zero is <.0001 in all regressions. where SMALL j = 1 if the market value of equity of company j is below the sample median in the middle year of the sample period; it equals zero otherwise. The indicator variable LARGE j = 1 -SMALL j . The remaining variables are as defined in Table 3 . The dataset consists of the combined sample in Table 3 ; it combines observations from the December, March, and June ending q uarters. The regression treats analyst-company effects as fixed. The reported R 2 values are based on overall variation within and across analyst-company pairs. The sample includes all company-analyst pairs in the I/B/E/S database that have a NFE observation post-FD and at least one NFE observation pre-FD. The windows for the early and late forecasts for each quarter are as in Table 2 . For each window, the latest eps estimate made by an analyst is used. Companies with stock price under $1 are excluded from t he sample. Panel B shows corresponding regressions for the consensus forecast where company effects are treated as fixed. Part II shows the corresponding estimates from regressions similar to the equation above, except that the variables SMALL and LARGE are replaced, respectively, by GMLIND and GLLIND. The indicator variable GMLIND = 1 for industries where guidance is more likely (I/B/E/S SIG codes 08 and 04), 0 otherwise. The indicator variable for industries where guidance is less likely, GLLIND = 1 -GMLIND. The p-value of the F-test of the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal zero and the null hypothesis that all unobserved effects equal zero is <.0001 in all regressions. .098
.049
The p-value of the F-test of the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal zero and the null hypothesis that all unobserved effects equal zero is <.0001 in all regressions. Table 6 Average dispersion of analyst forecasts for matched-pairs of companies (pre and post-FD)
The table shows the coefficient of variation (COV) of analyst forecasts. For company j for forecast period t, COV jt = (σ jt / |Χ jt |), where σ jt and Χ jt equal, respectively, the standard deviation and the mean of the forecasts of all analysts following the company. The windows for the early and late forecasts for each quarter are as in Table 2 . For each window, the latest eps estimate made by an analyst is used. Companies followed by t wo or fewer analysts and companies with mean eps forecasts of $.10 or lower in absolute value are excluded.
Forecast for Period
Mean Pre where NS jt is the normalized standard deviation (= σ jt / p j ); σ jt is the standard deviation of the forecasts of eps by all analysts following company j in year t, and p j is the latest stock price in the I/B/E/S database for a given forecast window for the middle year of the sample period for company j. The remaining variables are as defined in Table 3 . The regression treats company effects as fixed. The reported R 2 values are based on overall variation within and across companies. The sample period is 1997-2000 for the December ending quarter and 1998-2001 for the two subsequent quarters. The sample includes all companies in the I/B/E/S database that have a NS observation post-FD and at least one NS observation pre-FD. The windows for the early and l ate forecasts for each quarter are as in Table 2 . For each window, the latest eps estimate made by an analyst is used to compute σ. The combined sample pools observations from the three quarters. Companies followed by two or fewer analysts or with stock price under $1 are excluded from the sample. The p-value of the F-test of the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal zero and the null hypothesis that all unobserved effects equal zero is <.0001 in all regressions. where SMALL j = 1 if the market value of equity of company j is below the sample median in the middle year of the sample period; it equals zero otherwise. The indicator variable LARGE j = 1 -SMALL j . The remaining variables are defined in Tables 3 and 7 . The regression treats company effects as fixed. The reported R 2 values are based on overall variation within and across companies. The dataset consists of the combined sample in Table 7 ; it combines observations from the December, March, and June ending quarters. The sample includes all companies in the I/B/E/S database that have a NS observation post-FD and at least one NS observation pre-FD. The windows for the early and late forecasts for each quarter are as in Table 2 . For each window, the latest eps estimate made by an analyst is used to compute σ. The combined sample pools observations from the three quarters. Companies followed by two or fewer analysts or with stock price under $1 are excluded from the sample. Panel B shows the corresponding estimates from regressions similar to the equation above, except that the variables SMALL and LARGE are replaced, respectively, by GMLIND and GLLIND. The indicator variable GMLIND = 1 for industries where guidance is more likely (I/B/E/S SIG codes 08 and 04), 0 otherwise. The indicator variable for industries where guidance is less likely, GLLIND = 1 -GMLIND. The p-value of the F-test of the null hypothesis that all regression coefficients equal zero and the null hypothesis that all unobserved effects equal zero is <.0001 in all regressions. Denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests. where ∆SCORE it = | SCORE it -SCORE i,t-1 |; and SCORE it = analyst i's performance score in year t. The indicator variable REGFD t equals one for the post-Reg FD period (year 2000 for the December ending quarter and year 2001 for March and June ending quarters), and zero otherwise. The regression treats analyst effects as fixed. The reported R 2 values are based on overall variation within and across analysts. The sample consists of ∆SCORE observations over the years 1995-96, 1997-98 and 1999-2000 and 1996-97, 1998-99 and 2000-2001 for the March and June ending quarters. The combined sample pools observations from the three quarters. The windows for the early and late forecasts for each quarter are as in Table 2 . For each window, the latest eps estimate made by an analyst is used. The sample includes all analysts in the I/B/E/S database that have a DSCORE observation post-FD and at least one DSCORE observation pre-FD. The sample excludes all companies that are followed by only one analyst and all analysts that follow only one company.
Forecast for period
Latest Denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5%, levels, respectively, in two-tailed tests.
